CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Hickman, Kennedy. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang, racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters.2 About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). 313-314. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. . Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. . Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. When Did the U.S. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. Hickman, Kennedy. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. This article by Capt. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). We have no intention of yielding to pressure. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. 1. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. The United States denied involvement. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. In turn, that means Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Fluoride. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. $22. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. 10. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? That very night, the idea was put to the test. 10. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. 15. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. Early Military Career Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. . The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). Hickman, Kennedy. The intelligence community, including its SIGINT component, responded with a regional buildup to support the increase in U.S. operational forces. Oklahoma City Bombing. They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. 11. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. ", "No," replied McCone. For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. 4. Operation Fast and Furious 10 The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. (2021, February 16). 8. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. 136-137. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats.